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ABSTRACT. The rapidity of change has left scant opportunity for investigation of the
consequences of adoption of transgenic crops on long-term ecosystem or economic
system functioning. Economic theory suggests that, if the “Biotechnology Revolution” is
left to market forces alone, there will be neglected public goods. Theory and limited
empirical evidence suggests that there are signiﬁcant incentives for private ﬁrms to discount and neglect certain environmental impacts and to develop products that meet
mainly the needs of those able and willing to pay. Negative distributional impacts on
rural societies and economies will not normally enter the private calculus nor will the
long-term problems of insect and plant resistance. Thus, there is a strong case for
enhanced public roles with respect to the use of transgenic crops. The adoption of the
precautionary approach in public policies addressing transgenic crops is one alternative
to better reﬂect public concerns.

Agricultural biotechnology has been described as a tsunami washing over
agriculture – with fundamental impacts on how we grow and market our
food and ﬁber. While some argue that current biotechnology innovations
are just the next step in a long history of plant and animal breeding, others
strongly disagree. Modern transgenic biotechnology involves genetic
manipulations of transferring DNA from one species to another. For many,
these unique attributes of transgenic plants are cause for concern, particular with respect to possible environmental impacts. This concern is
heightened because of the large geographic distribution of such plants –
estimated to be 100 million acres in 1999 (James, 1999). Identifying these
environmental concerns and assessing their validity is hampered by an
exceptionally small core of scientiﬁc information (Ervin et al., 2001).
Therefore, neither producers nor consumers can know the long-run
environmental implications for any decisions they are making with respect
to the use of transgenic crops.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Conference on Agro-industrialization, Globalization and Economic Development, 6–7 August, 1999, American
Agricultural Economics Association Meetings, Nashville, Tennessee.
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In addition, the basic economic incentives faced by public and private
actors can result in the exclusion or only partial inclusion of important
public goods, such as the protection of the environment. Intellectual property rights temporarily protect transgenic crops and their products from
competition and can lead to short-term monopoly rents for patent holders.
Therefore, most private investors are interested in rapid pursuit of market
share for proﬁtable, low-exclusion cost goods.1 For them, desirable regulations tend to be those that will shorten the time between product
development and market sales.
Regulators are not immune to the pressures from industry for speedy
approval of release of transgenic seeds. Furthermore, if the private sector
is to be the innovator of biotechnology advances, agencies must strike a
balance between facilitating markets, protecting the public interest against
uncertain risks, and exploiting the full potential of transgenic crops for
public beneﬁt. Because of the difﬁculties of managing these disparate
incentives, particularly with an incomplete information base, a disconnect
between social net beneﬁts and private net beneﬁts can arise. This disconnect provides a strong argument for a strong public role with respect to
transgenic crops.
These issues can be explored within the framework of three themes.
First, transgenic crops have a high potential for social good – literally
improving the lives of billions of people. However, the development of
such biotechnology has largely been a ‘technology push’ revolution,
made possible through the rapid commercialization of recent scientiﬁc
advances. Because the current biotechnology path is shaped mostly by
private ﬁrms and less by public investment or regulation, because it is
not guided by rising scarcity value for key environmental resources,
such as water resources, nor pulled along by robust consumer markets,
there is a particular need for careful public scrutiny. These missing
incentives may mean that the social decision calculus for biotechnology
is not well informed by the full range and distribution of beneﬁts and
costs.
The second theme is that missing markets for environmental and other
attributes, as well as incomplete regulatory frameworks, may hinder transgenic crop biotechnology from reaching its potential for social good
because important social costs are not reﬂected in the prices of inputs or
outputs.
The third theme explores whether biotechnology is necessary for the
protection of wildlife habitat and wilderness and to feed the world’s population. While some claim that biotechnology is the answer to both food
security and a healthy planet, other demur. The insights gained from
examining these three themes can be used to draw public policy recommendations.

1

Low exclusion goods are goods which are relatively easy to ‘privatize’; that is,
there are low transaction costs to exclude any potential user from access to the
good. In contrast, high exclusion goods are characterized by high costs to exclusion.
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The environmental promise of transgenic crop biotechnology
There are at least four areas of potential transgenic crop contributions
(Ervin, 1999; US Congress, 1993):
•
•
•
•

gains in yields through improvements in plant efﬁciencies,
lower costs of labor and agriculture inputs (including irrigation water),
higher-quality food and value-added products, and
environmentally benign methods of managing weeds and insect pests,
and/or increasing yields.

Many of these potential contributions are environmental. For example, the
new transgenic crops could reduce the use of chemical pesticides and
lower the environmental risks of pesticides still in use. There may also be
savings in energy and air emissions from more efﬁcient transport of less
perishable products. If drought resistant transgenic plants become a
reality, not only could yield losses be minimized, but irrigation water
could be reduced allowing for better protection of environmental values,
such as adequate in-stream ﬂows (e.g., ﬁsh habitat). Also, if transgenic
crops translate into higher yields, there might be a reduction in the amount
of grassland or forest land converted into agricultural production – with
attendant environmental beneﬁts. While the potential for these environmental beneﬁts from transgenic crops is real, it is as yet unrealized.
Crop biotechnology is clearly in its infancy – emphasizing ﬁrst generation input traits, such as herbicide resistance. The next wave of output
quality traits is on the horizon (Kalaitzandonakes and Maltsbarger, 1998).
While environmental beneﬁts may be forthcoming from both of these generations of products, there is little research, or empirical evidence to date
as to whether such beneﬁts are signiﬁcant. In addition, there are concerns
that unintended negative environmental impacts will emerge and accumulate, and that potential public environmental goods will not be fully
exploited. These concerns have been heightened not only by the rapid pace
of product innovation, but also by recognition that the biotechnology crops
are possible because of the existence of a new technology, one with which
the world has little experience.
Theme one: biotechnology as a technology-push revolution
The greatest growth in transgenic products has been in crops with ‘builtin’ protection from pests, such as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), or those that are
herbicide tolerant.2 The planting of both types of seeds has been extraordinarily rapid – from the early 1990s when there was none to the current 100
million acres (40 million hectares) (James, 1999).
The ability to move cells and the information embedded in them – from
one plant or animal to another – has preceded a market demand for the
2

Insect resistance is achieved with Bt crops – mainly corn and cotton – when the Bt
insecticidal toxin is expressed by all the cells of the plant, thereby killing pests that
feed on the leaves and presumably reducing the need to use certain conventional
pesticides (Pretty, 1999). Herbicide tolerance in crops such as soybeans, canola,
and sugar beets, allows for application of broad spectrum herbicides to the
desired crop without damage, but with the suppression of weeds (Pretty, 1999).
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resultant products. Some authors therefore refer to crop biotechnology
products as ‘technology-push’ (as opposed to demand–pull) innovations
(Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996; Russell, 1991; Hackings, 1986). In Hicksian
terms, biotechnology is an ‘autonomous’ rather than an ‘induced’ innovation; that is, biotechnology is a ‘technology in search of applications’
(Hackings, 1986: 2). For the private commercial sector, this search translates into a search for applications that can be patented and from which
rents can be appropriated. The autonomous technology must ultimately be
accepted by buyers, but its initial path may vary from a similar innovation
spawned by rising prices of key inputs (e.g., management) and rising
values of public environmental resources.
Consider, for example, herbicide resistant plants such as ‘Round-up
Ready®’ soybeans. There are numerous alternatives to such herbicide resistant varieties as a means of managing weeds. As one critic notes:
Ridge tillage, no-till, banding, improved cultivars, newly registered
post-emergent herbicides and new planting systems gave farmers
many new options [for weed management]. The chemical toolbox is
overﬂowing – more than a dozen new active ingredients have been
registered in several families of chemistries. (Benbrook, 1999: 10)
Urgent demand for improved weed management does not, therefore,
appear to be the main motivator for the development of ‘Round-up
Ready®’ soybeans. Rather, biotechnology, as a method, provided
Monsanto a way to protect the proﬁts from their highly successful herbicide, Round-up®, after Monsanto’s patent expires in 2000, while giving
farmers a way to lower their weed management costs. A unique business
opportunity could be captured by developing ‘packages’ where newly
patented herbicide resistant seeds are ﬁrst linked with speciﬁc chemicals,
then sold with a technology fee (Just and Hueth, 1993; Hubbell and Welsh,
1998; Benbrook, 1999).3
Because of the manner in which the products are regulated in the US,
this biotechnology approach is particularly attractive to companies. In the
US, the time required to approve a new biotechnology product is about
one-half the time of approving a new chemical pesticide compound. The
cost to approval for the biotechnology product is only one-ﬁfth to oneseventh that of a chemical (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1995).
Such speed is particularly attractive to private ﬁrms because – as an
autonomous innovation – the proﬁtable sale of transgenic crops may
involve considerable costs to market creation, in addition to large research
and development costs. Clear, enforceable intellectual property rights and
rapid development-to-market elapsed times are important factors for capturing monopoly rents from the use of transgenic crops.
The differences between these autonomous innovations and induced
innovations technology suggest a hypothesis worthy of further exploration. The working hypothesis is: technologies that are pulled along by
3

Obtaining the intellectual property rights for certain germplasm also better positions companies to proﬁt from the second generation of agricultural biotechnology products – output quality traits.
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consumer demand, or by producer demand to lower environmental costs,
are more likely to be guided by full social values, provided by either
markets or extra-market (e.g., regulatory) institutions, than the ‘technology-push’ variety. Autonomous innovations arise largely in response
to scientiﬁc advances. Only after they enter the market can consumers and
producers express their preferences (i.e., provided feedback) and shape
their development trajectory through market and extra-market signals.
Also, because autonomous, directed innovations tend to emerge from
private laboratories with little contact with farmers or consumers, there
may be less sensitivity to farming and eating as part of ecological and cultural systems. Thus, important factors underlying the social desirability of
the product may be neglected (Busch et al., 1991).
The possibility that social goods may be neglected by autonomous innovations is heightened by the dominance of the private sector in the
biotechnology arena. It is more likely that autonomous innovations that
arise primarily from the private sector, such as biotechnology, will catch
public regulatory bodies unprepared for unintended social consequences.
Furthermore, the ﬁrms’ need for early product arrival into markets, means
ﬁrm’s may put considerable pressure on the regulatory institutions to
respond quickly. Lengthy regulatory steps to determine possible, but
uncertain, long-term environmental impacts may threaten the proﬁtability
of large private investments. Yet, unless forced by a regulatory requirement, existing incentives are for the private sector to neglect public goods,
such as protection of surface water or preservation of wildlife (Batie and
Ervin, 1999).
In the US, the widespread and rapid adoption of herbicide-resistant soybeans or Bt corn and cotton suggests that many farmers believe the new
transgenic pest management features are worth their cost. However,
refusals of European and Japanese consumers as well as some US ﬁrms
(e.g., Gerber and Heinz) to purchase products containing transgenic plants
suggests that at least some consumers are not yet convinced that there are
net beneﬁts for them from the products.
Theme two: missing information and missing markets
The ‘Biotechnology Revolution’ is being criticized for ignoring or exacerbating environmental problems. The ‘under supply’ of environmental
beneﬁts or the ‘over supply’ of environmental costs4 of transgenic crops
are classic examples of ‘missing markets’, where the normal workings of a
private market exclude full consideration of important outcomes off the
farm and in the future. The potential environmental beneﬁts of ﬁrst generation products relate to whether there is an actual reduction of use in the
more toxic pesticides due to the adoption of herbicide resistant or Bt crop
seeds (as compared to conventional crops.) The potential environmental
costs relate to whether transgenic crops can harm the environment
4

For the purposes of this paper, we are not addressing possible food safety issues
such as possible toxic or allergenic effects from inserted genes, from non-food
genes inserted in foods, antibiotic resistance or from unintended expression of
other plant traits due to insertion of new genes (The Royal Society, 1998).
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through negative impacts on non-target species or bio-diversity, on pest or
virus resistance, and on transfer of genes to wild relatives or to conventional crops (The Royal Society, 1998).
While environmental problems can emanate from conventional crops,
concern with transgenic crops is heightened because of the novelty of the
traits (e.g., tolerance to cold obtained from other species’ genes), because
other components of the ecosystem have not coevolved with these traits,
and because of the possible amount of acreage dedicated to such crops.
Furthermore, because the private beneﬁts of transgenic crops will occur
sooner and to a more focused set of beneﬁciaries than will any unintended
environmental costs, there can be a discounting of those costs by both
private companies and regulatory institutions (Batie and Schweikhardt,
1995). The same could be said for some non-transgenic conventional products and practices. However, the rapid development and adoption of
transgenics as well as the nature of the technology that produced them,
add a particular urgency for analysis that is unique to these products.
Such analysis is challenging; not only does each transgenic crop pose its
own potential beneﬁt, it also poses its own unique environmental risk
(Pretty, 1999). Differentiating between types of products and/or technologies is essential for analysis. However, there is not yet a strong,
credible scientiﬁc information base with which to address many of these
concerns. The paucity of such information is exacerbated by the reluctance
of private companies to share information on their products, since such
information is a crucial component determining return on their investments in transgenics. What follows then is a brief sketch of these concerns,
not a deﬁnitive, research-based determination of their validity.
Transgenic plants and the environment5
The concerns surrounding potential negative environmental outcomes of
transgenic crops include impacts stemming from changes in pesticide use,
impacts on non-target species, and pest and virus resistance.
Pesticide use impacts An environmental question with respect to genetically
engineered crops is whether they will be able to provide more environmentally benign methods of managing weeds and insect pests, as
promised. Unfortunately, an accurate assessment of the contribution of
herbicide-tolerant or Bt crops either to environmental improvements or to
producer proﬁts will require a decade or more of actual ﬁeld use (Gianessi
and Carpenter, 1999). This long evaluation period is necessitated by the
variability in weather, market prices, and pest infestation across regions
and time.
Because of changes in types and severity of pest infestations and hence
chemical use, the overall impact on the environment from agro-chemical
use following the adoption of transgenics depends on the toxicity of and
exposure to the chemicals used compared with the pre-transgenic
chemical portfolio. Preliminary evidence from the few years of experience
with transgenic crops in the US, as well as evidence from ﬁeld experi5

An expanded version of this section is contained in Ervin et al., 2001.
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ments, suggests that changes in pesticide use rates have been variable
(Gianessi and Carpenter, 1999). For example, recent USDA studies (USDA,
1999a and 1999b) found that, in the aggregate, as more US farmers adopted
transgenic crops, insecticidal treatments have been reduced on corn
(USDA, 1999a); whereas, the use of glyphosate herbicides, such as Roundup®, on corn and soybeans has increased.6 However, other, more toxic,
chemical decreased in use. The situation varies by crop and by region. For
example, when US cotton farmers adopted Bt cotton in the Southeast, the
results were less clear, because cotton has so many pests. In some cases,
there were more pesticide applications on Bt cotton than before adoption
– because the number of pests not susceptible to Bt increased following the
adoption of Bt cotton (USDA, 1999a). The introduction of genetically transformed potato plants did not have a major impact on insecticide use. Such
variable outcomes could be the result of early adoption problems or the
severity of pest problems and may not be representative of results over
longer periods of time.
There may also be other types of environmental impacts. For example,
herbicide-resistant plants may also allow reductions in plowing (as
opposed to conventional chemical applications) and thus reduce wind and
water sediment damages. However, at least to date, there is not enough
evidence to conclude whether overall and long-run pesticide damages to
the environment are reduced due to the adoption of biotechnology products. If early insect and weed resistance develops, the long-run use of
chemicals use with transgenics should exceed the short-run levels.
Non-target species impacts Although nearly half of the US’ major crop
acreage is in transgenic crops, there has not been an independent assessment of whether certain species are beneﬁting or being harmed by the
transgenics. Many crops are habitat to a range of insects or predatory
arthropods that prey on unwanted insect pests, that provide food for birds,
and that pollinate plants. These insects are referred to as ‘beneﬁcials’ as
integrated pest management strategies. Bt toxins can harm both pests and
‘beneﬁcials’ – although so can conventional insecticides. There is a laboratory research result that Bt transgenic plants pollen kills non-target
Monarch butterﬂy larvae, if the larvae are exposed to Bt pollen (Losey,
Rayor, and Carter, 1999). Whether wild Monarchs – whose larvae prefer to
eat milkweed and not corn – will actually be killed in signiﬁcant numbers
by Bt crops, however, is not yet resolved.7 For another example, no harm
has been shown to come to bees from Bt toxins (The Royal Society, 1998).
6

7

Yields results have been quite variable with some crop/region combinations not
seeing yield differences and some with spectacular yield results. While herbicide
resistance soybeans appear to have a yield drag, in some US Midwest regions,
farmers planting Bt corn had yields 26 per cent higher than conventional, nonmodiﬁed crops (USDA, 1999a). Even where there is a yield drag, farmers are
reporting savings in labor costs from weed control that continue to make planting
of transgenic crops proﬁtable.
To be meaningful, the comparison should be the number of Monarch butterﬂies
killed with the transgenics compared to the number killed without the transgenics, but with the use of conventional pesticides.
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However, Hilbeck et al. (1998) found that 62 per cent of the lacewing larvae
(predators of many agricultural insect pests) died after consuming prey
fed with Bt corn (versus 37 per cent mortality for the controls).8
Bt is only the ﬁrst generation of built-in plant toxin; patents have already
been secured on genes for toxins from scorpions, cone snails, funnel
spiders, and wasps (Pretty, 1999). The impact of the successful expression
of these genes on non-target species appears to be unknown. Other concerns include whether there could be a disruption of soil ecological
functioning from the breakdown of crop tissue (Saxena, Flores, and
Stutzky, 1999; Waltrud and Seidler, 1998) and release of toxins or if sequestration of toxins by herbivores could have unintended secondary effects on
their predators (Pretty, 1999) or the herbivores (e.g., cattle) themselves.
A fundamental concern with respect to biotechnological impacts transcends the potential unintended impact on any single species. It relates to
whether the reduction in diversity of crop and wild plant and animal
species creates a more fragile, less sustainable agricultural system (Hubbell
and Welsh, 1998; Hassebrook, 1989). Such narrowing of diversity – particularly in situ cropping systems – has been happening for sometime, but
could be accelerated by adoption of transgenic crops (The Royal Society,
1998; NRC, 1993). (There is, however, protection of genetic diversity in ex
situ seed banks.) The concern is that the very uniformity demanded and
rewarded by the emerging food system creates greater environmental risks
for biological damage or system collapse.
Another broad ecosystem concern is the potential effects of introducing
multiple transgenic crops. A strong conclusion in the 1998 Royal Society
Statement is the need for evaluating the environmental effects of transgenic crops as a whole, in addition to the case-by-case regulatory reviews.
That is, an individual crop approach will not likely capture the full set of
long-term continued effects of transgenic crops on whole ecosystems,
whether positive or negative. Moreover, the case-by-case analysis will
miss possible interaction (synergistic) and scale effects. This error may
occur, for example, if different transgenic crops exert common environmental inﬂuences. Individual reviews will also miss threshold issues that
may occur if common environmental effects of transgenic crops are aggregated across the countryside (e.g., predator–prey relationships) (Ervin,
1999).
Pest and virus resistance Another environmental concern is that transgenic
plants will either become weeds themselves or will transfer pollen to wild
relatives that will become weeds (Hubbell and Welsh, 1998; Linder and
Schmidt, 1995; Hails, 2000; NRC, 2000; Snow and Palma, 1997; Rissler and
8

There is non-crop research suggesting unintended negative consequences on nontarget species from release of transgenic organisms. A recent study at Purdue
University found that transgenic salmon or tilapia could present a signiﬁcant
threat to native, wild species. Dr Bill Muir, a geneticist, found that transgenic ﬁsh
have an advantage in attracting mates, but their offspring have lower survival
rates. Muir concludes ‘a transgenic animal could bring a wild population to
extinction in 40 generations’ (Sigurdson, 2000: 6). Muir refers to this gene as a
‘trojan horse gene’.

Environment and Development Economics 443
Mellon, 1996; Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996; The Royal Society, 1998). If these
weeds have particular ﬁtness advantages, such as being herbicide-resistant, they may become extremely difﬁcult to control in agricultural
settings.9 Thus, in regions where plants have weedy relatives, resistant
weeds may pose a threat and may out-compete native plants. Such competition could alter the current eco-system of a region and/or threaten wild
crop gene pools.
While gene ﬂow that enhances weediness can and has occurred with
conventional crops, some scientists agree that crop-to-wild outcrossing
will become more common with transgenic crops (Snow and Palma, 1997;
NRC, 2000). There are numerous cases where ‘exotics’ (e.g., harmful, nonindigenous species) associated with agriculture have caused problems and
where genetic diversity has been diminished by the introduction of crops
(NRC, 1993; Rissler and Mellon, 1996; US Congress, OTA, 1993).
Similar concerns relate to the possibility of intensifying existing or creating new viruses (Rissler and Mellon, 1996). Viral epidemics from natural
recombinations have already occurred. For example, the African cassava
mosaic virus is just such an epidemic (Conway, 1999).
An additional concern addresses organic agriculture. Should key pests
develop resistance to Bt, organic growers will have lost a major pest
control too.10 Susceptible insects can be thought of as an open access
resource. Economic theory suggests that if the beneﬁts of drawing on this
stock of susceptibility is high enough, the stock will be drawn down too
fast from a social accounting perspective (Clark and Carlson, 1990; Barnett
and Gibson, 1999). The ultimate impact on the environment of insecticidetolerant insects could be negative, as organic farmers resort to other insect
control chemicals and practices.
One approach to managing pest resistance has been to require farmers
using Bt crops to plant refuges with non Bt crops. The intention is to dilute
the frequency of recessive resistant traits in the population of target insects
(Barnett and Gibson, 1999; Hargrove, 1999). Unfortunately, there is limited
scientiﬁc information to date on how to best design a refuge to protect Bt
susceptible genes. Furthermore, for any farmer, there is little incentive to
invest in protecting the open-access resource – the potential to ‘free ride’
on the efforts of others is high (Barnett and Gibson, 1999; Hargrove, 1999).
Because of these concerns, it is unknown whether a refuge will be
adequate to avert or delay pest resistance.
A more fundamental criticism of the biotechnological approach to pest
control is that it continues along the path of providing a single control
component per pest and thus encourages dependence on pesticides
(Hubbell and Welsh, 1998). Not only does such a path assure that there will
be an increase in pests that are resistant (Hubbell and Welsh, 1998;
9

Furthermore, if farmers have to resort to pre-emergent herbicides, they may
negate the beneﬁts from the planting of herbicide tolerant plants (Hubbell and
Welsh, 1998).
10
Dr Bruce Tabashnik, Head of Entomology at the University of Arizona, notes that
there is evidence of Bt resistance for several insects in the US, Central America,
and Asia (Hargrove, 1999).
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Hassebrook, 1989; Rissler and Mellor, 1996), such a path also diverts attention from whole system management techniques, which are undergirded
with understanding of ecological connections (Krimsky and Wrubel,
1996)d. Thus, the critics worry that without more public investment, there
will be less research and development into non-pesticide alternatives, such
as reintroduction of pest-controlling crop rotations, biological controls,
cover crops, or intercropping (Cramer et al., 1991; Liebman and Jancke,
1990). This criticism is not unique to transgenic plants, however. It is the
same criticism leveled at the agricultural system since it became chemically
dependent.
An alternative, less chemical dependent path could be supported by different biotechnology products than those that are currently emerging.
Many argue that the alternative path is more socially desirable and can be
yield enhancing (Pretty, 1999). But it is a path that requires a reorientation
of agricultural research in ways that embed the lessons of evolutionary
biology (Altieri, 2000; Benbrook, 1999). However, it is difﬁcult to capture
the full social beneﬁts as proﬁts from many of these alternatives, thus they
tend to be neglected by the private sector.
Theme three: transgenic crops and habitat conservation
An issue related to the environment pertains to whether transgenic crops
will result in less need for cultivated land, and therefore result in a more
natural habitat (Avery, 1994; Shapiro, 1999). This issue usually is framed as
the need to feed a hungry world while protecting the environment. Such a
framing of the issue subsumes several assumptions:
1 that people are or will be hungry because of low agricultural yields and
higher costs of food,
2 transgenic crops are necessary to adequately raise yields and lower
costs of food, and
3 as society meets food needs with expanded acreage devoted to agriculture, more natural habitat will be lost – unless there are offsetting higher
yields on existing cropland acreage.11
Like many arguments about biotechnology, this one appears to be oversimpliﬁed.
Feeding the poor
The ﬁrst assumption is that people are hungry because of low agricultural
yields and higher costs of food. However, it is well known that, at least on
the global scale, people are not hungry because of insufﬁcient agricultural
yields. Rather, people are hungry because they are poor (Serageldin, 1999;
Conway, 1997). Consider the Green Revolution,12 which was motivated by
11

There is an additional assumption embedded in this argument: once a nation’s
agricultural needs are met, cultivated land will be returned to wild habitat (Pretty,
Vorley, and Keeney, 1998).
12
The Green Revolution was primarily driven by public investments in plant
breeding (Conway, 1997). Starting as early as the 1960s, plant breeders in international centers were applying modern research techniques to the agricultural
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public concerns to feed a hungry world. The fertilizer-responsive, dwarf
plants that resulted meant that overall food production of major cereal
crops doubled or even tripled in some regions (Lipton and Longhurst,
1989). Despite such successes, the extent to which the poor actually beneﬁted from the ‘Green Revolution’ has been the subject of much debate
(Conway, 1997; Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; Hazell and Ramasamy, 1991).
In many countries, the major beneﬁts of new varieties accrued to the
landowner elites and urban consumers, but not the rural laborers. Indeed,
in some cases, it appears that falling labor wages and rising land rents
offset the gains from falling food prices (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989). The
urban poor have beneﬁted most whenever government policies ensured
that increased yields translated into lower domestic prices (Conway, 1997).
Despite the uneven incidence of the beneﬁts of the Green Revolution, the
aggregate percentage of the developing world population who are not
getting enough to eat has declined from 50 per cent 35 years ago to about
20 per cent today (Conway, 1997). These successes were due in part to
exceptionally impressive increases in global productivity but also, in part,
to the existence of the appropriate institutional settings to lower the access
cost of food for the poor. Despite these successes, however, the absolute
numbers of undernourished people have declined by only 80 million (from
920 million to 840 million) between 1960 and 1990 (McCalla and Brown,
1999).
Thus, a close examination shows that the ultimate impact of the ‘Green
Revolution’ on the poor has depended on the geographic, social, and political circumstances and has been quite uneven across the globe (Conway,
1997). While the ‘Green Revolution’s’ high-yielding varieties were potentially poverty alleviating, a broader context of appropriate nondistortionary agricultural, rural development, and economic policies was
needed to capture this potential. The lesson is that until the problem of
food access for the population who lie outside of the market is resolved,
growing more transgenic corn, soybeans, or wheat by itself will do little to
feed the world’s hungry (Benbrook, 1999).
Yield increases and transgenic crops
The second assumption in the transgenics-save-habitat argument is that
transgenic crops are necessary to raise yields. While there is not a direct
relationships between increased world crop yields and food security for
the poor, fewer acres have been devoted to agricultural purposes than if
yield increases had not occurred. Without continual agricultural yield
improvements, many more millions of acres will have to be devoted to
agricultural uses as world population grows and as incomes and diets

problems of the developing world. Since then, plant breeders of the International
Agricultural Research Centers (IARC’s) supported by the Consultative Group on
International Research (CGIAR), as well as National Agricultural Research
Systems (NARS), have developed modern varieties of plants to be grown in a
wide variety of conditions in the less developed world. There are now sixteen
IARC’s grouped under the CGIAR.
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improve (Shapiro, 1999; Conway, 1997). However, the question remains
whether transgenic crops are the only or best way to achieve these yield
increases.
Some assert biotechnology is the solution to achieving a high yield,
environmentally protecting agriculture (Shapiro, 1999); others suggest it
should be considered an essential partner with more ecological
approaches, such as integrated pest management and with improved
economic policies (Conway, 1999). Still others contest whether transgenic
crops are necessary to achieve yield advances. For many reasons, many
farmers around the world are not near the potential of their land, using
either conventional or (non-biotechnological) alternative practices (Ruttan,
1999; Pretty, 1999). Furthermore, new agroecology methods of production
can also increase yields (Altieri, 20000). Thus, some argue, and some
studies (Pretty, 1999) suggest, that transgenic crops are only one of a suite
of possibilities for raising world food yields. From a farmer’s perspective,
whether transgenic crops are a superior alternative to, say, using more
inputs, will depend on the relative prices of inputs and the price received
for the crops as well as his or her budget constraint. From a social perspective, whether transgenic crops are a superior alternative will depend
on a full social accounting – including the potential costs from unintended
negative consequences.
Finally, some doubt that adequate private investments are being made
to break the physiological constraints that limit future increases in crop
yields. Ruttan argues that current private investments in biotechnology
favor input-saving technologies and the next generation of private investments will be focused on quality attributes. Thus ‘it would appear
exceedingly rash to predict that . . . [there will be] any measurable impact
on production in the next several decades’ (Ruttan, 1999 referencing
Duvick, 1996). McCalla and Brown (1999) also note that 90 per cent of the
world’s food consumption takes place in the country where the food is
produced. Critical food needs are in the Tropics, but these are not the
locations with expected high private returns due to transgenic innovations.
Since the ‘biotechnology revolution’ is being led by private companies,
there is little reason to believe the products that emerge are destined to
feed the billions on the planet or to protect the environment (Conway,
1997). Because the private sector is motivated by incentives such as
proﬁts, timely return to stockholders, and market share, it is not surprising that the genetic manipulation funded by the private sector would
emphasize investments and product attributes that would differ from that
of a more complete public agenda (Conway, 1997; Heffernan, 1999). Put
more formally, one would expect the private sector to invest in low exclusion goods, such as seed-chemical-machinery ‘packages’ or value-added
foods, and neglect high exclusion goods, such as protection of biodiversity
or the improvement of minor traditional crops in the developing world.
Private investments can thus be expected to focus on high-return and
high-value crops, on labor-saving technologies, and the needs of capitalintensive farming in order to feed those who can pay, and not on the
needs of the smallholder farmers in the developing world nor on
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environmental conservation (Conway, 1997).13 Thus, there is a role for the
public sector.
Even with more public sector involvement, however, there may be
barriers to more innovations directed at the needs of the poor. Even if
barriers posed by the high cost of biotechnology research drops, public
institutions may be unable to gain access to the information for, or the right
to, create new products – such as customized seeds for micro-climates or
transgenic crops that do not require pesticides (Conway, 1999). ‘Public
sector plant breeders. . .are handicapped by the high disparity in resources
and negotiating power between themselves and the companies [who
closely guard their proprietary technologies]’ (Conway, 1999).
Yields and wildlife
The third assumption of the argument involves predicting the environmental outcomes expected with adoption of transgenic crops. The
assumption is that high-yielding agriculture saves habitat. It is not obvious
that high yields correlate well with acreage in wilderness and enhanced
beneﬁts for wildlife nor that low yields are necessarily detrimental to
wildlife. Wildlife and agriculture, for example, are not necessary incompatible – farmland can support a broad diversity of wildlife as well as
water quality and ﬂood control beneﬁts (Pretty, Vorley, and Keeney, 1998).
And, whole expansion of agriculture into wilderness areas can occur
because of high prices for commercially traded foods and ﬁbers – perhaps
as a result of low yields relative to quantities demanded – expansion can
also occur as poor farmers pursue low-input extractive farming systems
for a subsistence living. The latter motivation may have little to do with
world yields or prices. Two studies of the Amazon forest, for example,
found that intensifying existing cropland use did not remove the pressures
for deforestation (Carpentier et al., forthcoming; Yanggen and Reardon,
2001). Such evidence suggests that high yields may be necessary to
protect habitat in the aggregate, but that high yields are not sufﬁcient to do
so.
Furthermore, much of the land not cultivated is currently uneconomical
to farm at today’s prices – being too far from markets, being too poor or
quality, and/or requiring irrigation or drainage (Conway, 1999). Which of
these lands would be cultivated at higher prices is an unresolved empirical
question. Put simply: the relationships between transgenic crops, cropland
intensiﬁcation, and habitat conservation is neither well researched nor
clear. The argument that adoption of transgenic crops will either feed the
poor or will save habitat oversimpliﬁes exceptionally complex situations.
13

There are cases where private companies have partnered with public institutions
or foundations to focus on the needs of poor people. For example, Monsanto has
entered into agreements with both Kenyan and Mexican research institutions for
the development of virus resistant crops (Serageldin, 1999). While these partnerships appear to be working well, they are few in number and modest components
of philanthropic programs. And, many argue that public or foundation funding
for biotechnology products geared to environmental protection or the needs of the
poor are quite inadequate (Ruttan, 1999; Serageldin, 1999).
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Policy implications
The pace of transgenic crops advances and adoption have been so rapid
that they are outstripping our knowledge and the capacity of our institutions. Complicating the situation is the lack of a credible, mature
information base by which to evaluate net environmental beneﬁts; empirical evidence is just beginning to emerge. While some of the biotechnology
ﬁrms have information on biotechnology product performance, at least
some of this information is guarded as intellectual property (Ransom,
Busch, and Middendorf, 1998).
The outstripping of our science knowledge combined with missing
markets implies that responsible regulatory agencies have little information to assess the long-term effects of transgenic crops, increasing the
probability of a disconnect between net social and net private beneﬁts.
While the US federal government has protocols in place to evaluate
biotechnologies for expected environmental, a uniﬁed approach across
agencies, responsive to the missing markets discussed above, does not
exist (NRC, 2000).
Elements of a precautionary approach
One possible response to this disconnect and uncertainty is for the US to
adopt a precautionary approach. One way to conceptualize the precautionary approach is to consider who bears the risks of an error. There are
essentially two types of errors: Type I and Type II. Type I, is accepting that
signiﬁcant risk will occur when, in fact, risks do not exist. Type II is the
error of accepting that there is not environmental risk when, in fact, signiﬁcant risks do exist. The proverbial version of avoiding a Type I error is
‘he who hesitates, is lost’; whereas, that of avoiding a Type II error is
‘better safe than sorry’. However, the changes of making each type of error
are inversely related to each other. That is, regulatory systems that reduce
one type of error will necessarily increase the chance of making the other
type of error. The degree of conﬁdence required by a regulatory system to
avoid either type of error is clearly a crucial policy choice.
A precautionary approach essentially is one that reduces the chance of
making a Type II error. However, the lower the probability of making a
Type II error, the higher the costs (i.e., deferred beneﬁts) stemming from
delay. These costs will be borne by investors and others who would have
beneﬁted from the earlier or broader use of transgenic crops. The ‘precautionary principle’ is ﬁrmly embedded in much of European environmental
policy, and requires that regulatory action be taken to protect the environment before resolving uncertainty about possible environmental or health
damages (Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997). In contrast to Europe, most
US crop protection policy tends toward avoiding Type I errors,14 that is,
erroneously accepting that signiﬁcant risks will occur when in fact the
14

This crop protection approach can be contrasted with US pharmaceutical policy
– where potential drugs must be proven both safe and effective before placed on
the market. The drug policies are designed to avoid Type II errors. Recently the
US Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) also adopted the precautionary approach
with respect to pesticide residues on food (Batie, Swinton, and Schulz, 1999).
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risks do not exist. For example, historically, much US legislation has given
considerable weight to known pesticide use and requires a regulatory balancing against uncertain risks (Wargo, 1996). With this type of risk
management and, assuming no countervailing liability rules for ﬁrms or
farmers, most costs of being too aggressive in moving a crop from development to market (e.g., causing environmental harm) are borne by the
general public.15
In considering the precautionary approach, the global cost of being cautious, needs to be balanced against the costs of being too aggressive. These
costs are born by different publics. However, from social accountings of
transgenic crops, a case can be made that the costs of caution generally
should not be large. For example, Nelson et al. (1999) estimate only slight
production beneﬁts or price effects of full global adoption of Bt corn and
Round-up Ready®’ soybeans. For corn, the analysis projects only a 1.9 per
cent increase in production and a 4.2 per cent decline in price; for soybeans, 0.5 per cent increase in production and a 0.6 per cent decline in
price. Small beneﬁts, if any, are estimated for farmers, and only negligible
gains are expected for consumers. Moreover, a precautionary approach
would not necessarily void those beneﬁts, but delay them until more evidence is accumulated. Transgenic crop technology can come on stream
rapidly after enough science has accumulated, and after adequate monitoring and reviews have been conducted, to assure that excessive
environmental and other risks are not present. Furthermore, the precautionary approach avoids two different risks. One, the potential costs of not
being precautionary are serious environmental effects, some that may be
irreversible. Two, the loss of the technology is possible if larger damages
or a strong public backlash prematurely stops development and diffusion.
In this latter case, designing precautionary regulatory institutions is not
only in the interests of those concerned about negative environmental
effects, but of the industry as well. If a large human or environmental
health catastrophe emerges due to poor national or international oversight,
it could not only cause a short-term setback for the industry, but also jeopardize the entire future of biotechnology and its considerable potential. In
the US the nuclear power industry experienced this set of events and has
never fully recovered.
A precautionary approach, however, does not imply a moratorium on
all transgenic crops. Pretty (1999) and the Royal Society (1998) have made
clear that this technology has very different strands, some for which we
have good science with little apparent risk and others for which we have
only meager understanding with large potential environmental effects.
Thus, adopting a precautionary approach does not mean suspending
development and diffusion of all products. If a product shows genuine
productivity or other beneﬁts, such as, economic, health, or environmental
advantages, with little risk, it should be a prime candidate to move to practice. That judgment will depend on the particular country’s economic,
social, and environmental conditions, and cannot be generalized.
15

However, one cost of being too aggressive that would be borne, at least in part,
by producers would be increased pest resistance to chemical controls.
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The public role16
Whether the US moves toward a more precautionary approach, there
appears to be a strong case to be made for an enhanced public role in the
area of transgenic crops. The basic incentives, the missing markets, and the
incomplete science all imply that the private sector will not by itself deliver
the highest net social beneﬁts. We envision the improved role for public
institutions – along or in concert with others – to include two major
elements.
1 Increase investment in public research and development for biotechnology to
assure that the public good aspects of biotechnology receive adequate attention
and to build a credible scientiﬁc base, including a comprehensive monitoring
system, by which to evaluate biotechnologies and their impacts
Wise decisions about the development and diffusion of biotechnologies
must begin with sound understandings of their productivity and economic, health, environmental, and social effects. Such a knowledge base is
necessary, for informed decisions and for the importance of avoiding
negative effects and capturing the full potential beneﬁts of the technology.
Furthermore, the growth of private funding, particularly when coupled
with difﬁculties in access to certain germplasm because of patent laws can
lead to neglect of research with high rates of social return, but with low
rates of private proﬁts. This neglected research includes basic research as
well as research that addresses conservation and the environmental problems, alternative farming systems, rural development impacts, and
nutrition and food access issues (Merrigan, 1999; Welsh, 1999).
While there is a small and growing core of knowledge about the
environmental effects of transgenic crops, there are few incentives for
private ﬁrms to add to this knowledge. For example, there is virtually no
research that links the possible pesticide reductions and shifts in composition to environmental resources via fate, transport and toxicity. The lack
of monitoring data of ecosystem scales is particularly noteworthy. An
increase in public investment to acquire longitudinal data on shifts in pesticide use for adopters and non-adopters, and on factors that inﬂuence
those shifts apart from adoption of crop biotechnology is crucial. In
addition, it is essential to link the ﬁndings to spatial environment and
resource conditions (Ervin et al., 2001).
There has also been insufﬁcient research about the potential impacts of
transgenic crops on non-target organisms (NRC, 2000). A larger systematic
research program on the ecological implications of crop biotechnology,
including wide-scale monitoring, is needed to anticipate the full range of
environmental effects. In addition, it is important to make evaluations of
transgenic insect-resistant crops relative to current agricultural practices
(NRC, 2000). Chemically intensive practices potentially have more negative impacts on non-target organisms than certain transgenic insect
resistant crops. However, the growing popularity of organic food and
organic production systems points to the need to include alternative/sustainable systems in such comparative evaluations.
16

Expansions of this section are contained in Ervin et al. (2001).
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Similarly, our current knowledge is limited regarding the extent to
which wild plant populations are affected by herbicides, insects, or
viruses. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to predict the extent to which wild or
weedy populations would beneﬁt from resistance to these factors (NRC,
2000). In general, transgene spread will occur. However, we do not know
if transgenes will persist in the wild or increase the weediness of wild
plants. The latter is more likely to happen if transgenic crops are introduced in areas close to their wild relatives.
Also, some promising research regarding genetic engineering of the
chloroplast genome might result in genetic engineering methods that
hobble transgene spread via pollen. In addition, incentives are needed to
encourage ﬁrms to develop transgenic crops, recombinant technologies,
and/or management regimes that would make outcrossing of beneﬁcial
genes to wild relatives less likely. Such incentives do not currently
exist.
An increase in funding for risk assessment, including better monitoring
systems, is a key policy need if the various resistance effects and their
environmental impacts are to be understood. With improved monitoring
and assessment information, the policy decisions on appropriate controls
could be made with more precision. For example, the National Research
Council (2000) criticized the US Environmental Protection Agency for not
developing and implementing a general policy with respect to resistance
management plans for transgenic crops. The Council goes on to recommend that resistance management regimes should be encouraged when ‘a
pest protectant or its functional equivalent is providing effective pest
control, and if growing a new transgenic pest protected plant variety
threatens the utility of existing uses of the pest protectant or its functional
equivalent . . .’ (NRC, 2000: 103).17
In addition to reducing potential public costs, R&D could also foster
more public beneﬁts. For example, future research on insect-resistant crops
of all types, could investigate the development of traits which make resistance development less likely. Such traits could include manifestation of
tolerance to pest damage rather than pesticidal properties (Hubbell and
Welsh, 1998), or the ability to delay symptoms and damage from
pathogens until after the plant has produced the valuable seeds or fruit. In
this vein, the National Research Council recently cited the need for ecological research to develop pest-protected plants, including transgenic
crops, which can be used within ecologically and evolutionary sustainable
approaches to agriculture (NRC, 2000). A second example is the need to
develop new crops with drought resistant characteristics. This emphasis
seems particularly timely given the growing uncertainty of climate change
and endangered species concerns that may limit agricultural uses of water.
Institutions and incentives are needed to spur research in these areas,
which will most likely originate in the public sector.
17

The Council intends for resistance management to apply to ‘all uses’ of the pest
protectant, not just its use within transgenic crops. Regarding Bt crops and resistance management, this intention implies that resistance management practices
would also be encouraged for microbial Bt sprays in addition to Bt crops.
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2. Develop appropriate regulatory frameworks for transgenic crops
Recommendations to improve the US regulatory system for agricultural
biotechnology center on four areas of reform (Ervin et al., 2001). First, if
environmental concerns are to be better addressed, the roles of ecological
and other environmental scientists in the regulatory process should be
increased. There is obvious synergy between this recommendation and
one to increase public research on the public good aspects of agricultural
biotechnology. Regal (1999) had proposed the wider use of multidisciplinary review teams, including environmental scientists. To help make the
environmental scientists effective members of the process, the United
States Department of Agriculture budget dedicated to risk assessment of
transgenic crops would also need to be increased. Traditionally, the
amount available for risk assessment is a mere $1 million to $2 million. Yet
risk assessments are necessary to close the knowledge gap. Also, Hails
(2000) argues that research should move from the laboratory and limited
ﬁeld experiments to large-scale trials. Such trials will account for the fact
that large pollen sources can interact on a regional scale, increasing the risk
of unintended environmental impacts.
Another possible improvement in the regulatory framework would be
for an environmental agency to lead the ecological assessment of transgenic plants (Rissler and Mellon, 1996). Under such a reform, all transgenic
crops would be tested before release (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996), at least
for the gene ﬂow and ‘weediness’, using a three-tiered approach that
would separate low- and high-risk crops early in the process (Rissler and
Mellon, 1996). Designating a lead environmental body also may help eliminate potential gaps in regulatory coverage identiﬁed by the National
Research Council (2000), and reduce the concern that the USDA is simultaneously advocating the use of transgenic plants while trying to regulate
their environmental risks. Similarly, the lead agency could exercise oversight regarding ‘revolving door’ job switches among industry and
government regulators (Regal, 1999).
A third recommendation is to improve the public transparency of the US
regulatory process. The NRC review (2000) concluded that ‘The quantity,
quality, and public accessibility of information on the regulation of transgenic pest-protected plant products should be expanded’ (NRC, 2000,
p. 15). The USDA database was deemed particularly useful and recommended as a model. However, they recommended more readily
available and clearer public data from the Environmental Protection
Agency. A related issue is that biotechnology companies select the priority
information for review, and thus the federal agencies may not be able to
obtain adequate information to inform the public (NRC, 2000). This
problem is compounded when the biotechnology companies guard much
of their data as conﬁdential business information.
In addition, the present regulatory system does not consider socio-economic factors – the so-called ‘fourth criterion’ – in the processes (Lacy,
forthcoming). There is a strong public good argument for assuring an
adequate margin of safety for determining whether transgenic plants
should be released. The selection of Type I or Type II error and the conﬁdence level is inherently a social decision not a scientiﬁc one. Such a reform
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could result in more public involvement in the decision process, and
thereby bolster the public’s conﬁdence in transgenic plants. However, any
public participation requirements would have to be designed carefully to
control excessive transaction costs and to balance powerful lobbying
groups that espouse narrow views.
Given the vast potential importance of the transgenic crops for food,
energy, human health, and the environment, an independent over-arching
body commissioned by the government may eventually be needed to evaluate the full sweep of issues emerging from the transgenic crops. The
Royal Society Committee endorsed the creation of such a body in the
United Kingdom. The US does not have such a body. Building such as
institution in developing countries with little science infrastructure or
regulatory apparatus would be a formidable challenge. The greatest challenge may be in creating an effective international institution empowered
to govern the diffusion of biotechnologies that carry transboundary
environmental risks. None exists at this point.
Conclusion
Transgenic crops clearly have signiﬁcant potential to improve welfare.
Many of the short-term beneﬁts to ﬁrms and farmers are already evident,
with possible beneﬁts to consumers clearly in sight. Yet there may be
serious long-term environmental costs not yet seen, and there may be uses
of biotechnology for products and techniques for which there are signiﬁcant social beneﬁts but insufﬁcient commercial proﬁts. There is a strong
case to be made for more effective public involvement in transgenic crop
development and adoption – not to replace markets but to complement
them – by both requiring more comprehensive testing and risk assessment
and by research on alternative cropping systems that will not be undertaken by for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
Such enhanced public research requires more funding either from the
general treasury or from taxes or fees from ﬁrms. Currently, a consortium
of biotechnology ﬁrms have organized a pro-biotech informational campaign through the Council for Biotechnology that has $50 million
earmarked for the ﬁrst year of a three to ﬁve year campaign (Hillyer, 2000)
– an amount that dwarfs the United States’ Department of Agriculture’s
$1 million or $2 million for transgenic crops risk assessments. Whether
biotech ﬁrms should bear the costs of their own regulation and/or the provision of public goods is a political decision. However, a case can be made
that, if companies acknowledged the existence of uncertain risks and if the
public were assured that potential environmental outcomes were given
more effective scrutiny by public institutions, public acceptance of transgenic crops would be more likely than with a pro-biotech campaign
(Sandman, 1999). Such is one of the lessons of the US nuclear power
industry’s history of inadequate risk communication.
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